Khamenei’s demise will not be the tip of all this, however merely the start. What comes subsequent might open the primary crack in Iran’s regime, writes DAVID PATRIKARAKOS

He’s dead. Finally. Iran‘s Supreme Leader, the sinister and brutal octogenarian Ali Khamenei, has met a well-deserved end at the hands of a joint US-Israeli strike.

But beyond the welcome demise of one of the longest-serving – and most vicious – dictators in modern history, what does this actually mean?

In and of itself, his death is not decisive. Khamenei was already nearing the end of his life, and the regime had long been preparing for succession. 

The reported death of his son Mojtaba alongside him would be more significant Mojtaba was widely seen as his father’s likely heir.

The crucial point – and it is one I keep repeating – is that without a coherent and organised opposition, and without a credible opposition leader to rally around, any successor is almost certain to come from within the regime itself.

So who might that be?

During the 12-day conflict with Israel last June – which I refuse to call a war, because as we are now seeing, it never truly ended – Khamenei reportedly identified three possible successors: the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i; his chief of staff, Ali Asghar Hejazi; and Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder. 

All are regime insiders. All are senior clerics. This matters, because under the constitution the Supreme Leader must be a cleric appointed by the Assembly of Experts.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (pictured) died in joint US and Israeli strikes in Tehran in the early hours of Saturday

Yet I have never found these names entirely convincing.

To my mind, a more plausible figure has always been Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and one of the most experienced operators in the system. 

During recent internal unrest, Khamenei increasingly entrusted Larijani with the day-to-day running of the state, sidelining President Masoud Pezeshkian in the process.

True, Larijani is not a cleric. But Iran has long functioned less as a pure theocracy than as a praetorian state, heavily shaped – and in many ways dominated – by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Nor should we forget that Khamenei himself lacked the senior religious credentials traditionally required for the role when he was elevated in 1989. The Assembly of Experts simply fudged the rules.

In recent months, Larijani’s influence has only grown. He has overseen the suppression of protests, managed relations with key partners such as Russia and Qatar, handled sensitive nuclear diplomacy, and helped prepare Iran for confrontation with Israel and the United States.

He will undoubtedly be high on any Israeli or American target list. Given Israel’s extraordinary penetration of Iran’s security apparatus, his survival is far from guaranteed. Were I in his position, I would be keeping my head well below ground.

But Khamenei’s death could trigger something even more consequential than succession: defections.

Ali Larijani (pictured), chair of the Supreme National Security Commission who, in recent weeks, Khamenei had given increasing power to 

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (pictured), the son of the Shah overthrown in 1979, is a potential successor to lead Iran

As long as the regime remains internally cohesive – above all, as long as the Artesh and, more importantly, the Revolutionary Guards remain loyal – the system will endure.

But moments like this create uncertainty – uncertainty breeds calculation. Simply put: senior figures start to hedge. They start to consider their future beyond the regime.

Donald Trump understands this dynamic well. He has spoken openly about offering immunity and inducements to insiders willing to break ranks.

If Khamenei’s death triggers a wave of elite defections, it could represent the first genuine crack in the Islamic Republic’s foundations – and the beginning of the end for a system that has endured for nearly half a century.

Should that happen, space could open for a genuine opposition movement to emerge.

In that scenario, one figure may loom large: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the Shah overthrown in 1979.

Pahlavi has lived in exile for nearly five decades. He is, in many ways, more American than Iranian. 

I am sceptical that he possesses the political skill required to rule. But there is no question that he has become a powerful symbol for many Iranians. During recent protests, demonstrators across the country chanted his name.

He may yet serve as a rallying point if Iran enters a true transition of power to a more western-facing and, frankly, saner regime.

Either way, one thing is certain: Khamenei’s death is not the end of all this, merely the beginning.